INTRODUCTION
Employment protection legislation consists of rules and procedures concerning the faculty of companies to hire or dismiss workers.
Employment protection legislation deals with:
 the lawfulness of probationary periods, mandated notice periods and severance payments (payments to workers for early contract termination);  procedural requirements to be followed for individual dismissals or collective redundancies;  sanctions for unfair dismissal; and  conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts.
Such rules and procedures may be enshrined in law or in collective or individual labour contracts. The effectiveness of employment protection also depends on additional factors including court interpretations of legislative and contractual provisions.
Employment protection legislation is not granted uniformly in all Member
States. Apart from the common minimum requirements stemming from EU legislation and other international obligations (see below), the characteristics of employment protection legislation mostly reflect different legal and institutional traditions. In countries with civil law traditions such legislation is usually regulated by law, while in common law countries it relies more on private contracts and dispute resolution. In the latter countries courts have ample judicial discretion while in the former legislation plays a greater role.
Non-compliance with the terms of the legislation or with those agreed in collective contracts renders dismissal unlawful or invalid. This has implications for the obligations of the employer and the rights of the worker that vary between countries.
As a general rule, dismissal motivated by discriminatory reasons is considered unlawful, while protection to employees is usually not provided when dismissals are justified by major disciplinary reasons. Sanctions are generally also envisaged for the unlawful use of fixedterm contracts, i.e. outside the conditions established by legislation.
The rationale for employment protection legislation is to protect workers from arbitrary action by employers through a series of requirements the latter must comply with when dismissing workers. These reflect the social costs of dismissal to some extent. A dismissed worker loses income, tenurerelated benefits and, potentially, accumulated job-specific skills and experience. If it takes a long time to find another job, some workers may also suffer negative social and health effects.
Society also bears the costs of workers losing their jobs as the financing of unemployment benefits and active labour market policies falls largely on Labour market segmentation means the coexistence in the labour market of different categories ('segments') of workers, characterised by different levels of job security and/or access to social security and other benefits and by low transition rates from less secure to more secure categories. The main distinction is typically, but not exclusively, between workers with temporary contracts and those with permanent ones.
rates. These may contribute to higher unemployment rates and longer periods out of work for weaker groups such as young and/or low-skilled workers. On the other hand, there is no conclusive evidence that the strictness of employment protection legislation affects overall unemployment rates.
Employment protection legislation is usually the result of complex legislative and non-legislative frameworks. As such, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach and the policy response to challenges in this area should be tailored to each country's specificities. Moreover employment protection legislation should be considered as part of a broader institutional framework which includes social protection systems, active labour market policies and access to lifelong learning.
Reforms of employment protection legislation should be seen in relation to these institutional features and should be consistent with a 'flexicurity' approach 6 . The structure of this factsheet is as follows.
Section 2 provides an identification of the main challenges commonly related to dysfunctional employment protection legislation systems. These are high segmentation and low dynamism of the labour market.
Section 3 describes policy levers related to the different challenges and aspects of employment protection legislation.
Section 4 presents an overview of the state of play across Member States.
Finally, detailed definitions and statistics are presented in the Annex.
This factsheet is related to those on active labour market policies, unemployment benefits, undeclared work, and skills for the labour market.
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Principle 5 states among other things that 'the transition towards open-ended forms of employment shall be fostered' that 'in accordance with legislation and collective agreements, the necessary flexibility for employers to adapt swiftly to changes in the economic context shall be ensured' and that 'employment relationships that lead to precarious working conditions shall be prevented, including by prohibiting abuse of atypical contracts '. 8 Principle 7 states among other things that 'prior to any dismissal, workers have the right to be informed of the reasons and be granted a reasonable period of notice. They have the right to access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and, in case of unjustified dismissal, a right to redress, including adequate compensation'.
POLICY CHALLENGES: AN OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE IN EU COUNTRIES
As discussed in the introduction, high segmentation and low dynamism of the labour market are the most common challenges where employment protection legislation is excessively strict or imbalanced in favour of protecting permanent workers. Moreover, undeclared work may occur as a result of excessive costs for firing regular workers, in addition to other causes such as excessive taxation on labour. (Undeclared work is discussed in a separate thematic factsheet).
The concept of labour market segmentation implies that (at least) two 'segments' coexist in the labour market. One segment of the workforce comprises workers with stable employment relationships, protection against dismissal and full access to social protection. Another segment is characterised by workers with one or more of the following: In a segmented labour market, fixedterm/atypical workers are typically in this situation against their will (i.e. they would prefer to work with a permanent contract 10 ) and often perform tasks that are not temporary by nature.
Moreover, there are limited opportunities to transition from the less protected to the more protected segment of the labour force. In practice, temporary contracts represent dead ends rather than stepping stones to permanent contracts.
The combination of high shares of fixed-term employees and low transition rates towards permanent employment seems particularly worrying in countries such as Poland, Spain and France (Figure 1 ). Countries with a high proportion of self-employment may also be more exposed to segmentation problems. This is the case when self-employment conceals partial abuses in order to mask what are actually dependent employment relationships (so-called bogus self-employment) and when Member States have not adapted their social security systems to include the self-employed 11 .
The percentage of self-employed people (without employees) is highest in Greece (22.2%), Romania (15.4%) and Italy (15.4%), followed by Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia ( Figure 2 ). 10 In the EU, 66.4 % of temporary workers (aged 20-64) in 2015 were in this status because they could not find a permanent job (Eurostat, LFS). Strict protection against dismissal reduces labour turnover: by increasing the cost to businesses of separating from workers, it tends to reduce both firing and hiring rates. This may have little or no effect on overall unemployment. However, it does affect the process of job creation and destruction, the duration of unemployment and the age composition of those out of work, and how efficiently labour is reallocated across firms and industries.
A combined reading of hiring and separation rates 12 gives an idea of labour market turnover ( Figure  3 ). When both are high, the labour market is considered more dynamic and flexible (e.g. as in the case of Scandinavian and Baltic countries on the right side of the figure). However, high hiring/ separation rates could be also an effect of the widespread use of temporary contracts. This ambiguity is partly reflected in the case of Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Cyprus. More specific analysis is in any case necessary in order to draw conclusions about the nature of labour turnover as such.
12 Hiring and separation rates can be computed as the ratio to total employment of, respectively: i) individual transitions from unemployment to employment and job-tojob transitions (hiring rate); ii) individual transitions from employment to unemployment (separation rate). In absolute terms, if hires outnumber separations, net employment increases. Long tenure periods, especially for prime-age individuals, may also be a sign of static labour markets in which workers remain attached to their job and do not move between more productive firms and sectors. This might be relevant in particular where long tenure coexists with a high proportion of temporary workers (e.g. in France, Croatia, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia). This points to labour market segmentation -it is a sign that 'insiders' are able to benefit from relatively long and stable career paths while 'outsiders' experience short-term jobs. Figure 4 gives an indication of average job tenure for workers aged 15-64. Labour market segmentation does not affect different population groups equally. Temporary employees and self-employed workers (without employees) tend to be poorly educated, to work part-time and to be employed in agriculture, construction or services.
While temporary employees are usually young, the chance of being in 'solo selfemployment' increases with age. This emerges clearly from a European Commission analysis 13 presented in Figure 5 . Strict employment protection legislation increases the duration of unemployment and long-term unemployment rates. The predicted effect of such legislation on the overall unemployment rate is ambivalent (as strong employment protection legislation reduces both job creation and job destruction). However, the combination of lower job destruction and reduced job creation is likely to translate into longer unemployment spells. In particular, unemployment tends to last longer for those entering the labour market for the first time and for intermittent spells (e.g. groups where the young, the low-skilled and women are overrepresented). Moreover, while it is widely recognised that job security can encourage employees to invest in firm-specific skills that help productivity, overly strong employment protection legislation can hurt productivity and growth by leading to less efficient 17 These differences remain after controlling for individual and job-specific characteristics that influence the demand of specific contract types. European Commission (2017) The effectiveness of the dispute resolution system following claims of unfair dismissal has a strong impact on employment protection legislation in practice. Early dispute resolution frameworks reduce the direct costs and uncertainty of labour disputes. The design of pre-trial conciliation and mediation mechanisms and the distribution of costs between the plaintiff and the defendant may influence the litigation rate. Similarly, the possibility for courts to take into account pre-court attempts to negotiate a settlement may influence the incentives to resolve disputes before going to court. This can ultimately reduce labour litigation and the uncertainty of court rulings.
In terms of best policy practice, the assessment of employment protection legislation reform priorities across EU 
Excessive proliferation of different types of contracts may lead to serious gaps between insiders and outsiders ('contractual fragmentation').
Increasing the flexibility of specific types of contracts without modifying the rules for permanent contracts or for collective dismissals has in the past widened the gaps between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. This has led to segmentation of the market in a number of Member States.
There is no single way to reform employment protection legislation systems but different paths that depend on country characteristics. The specific scope and direction of reforms depend on:
 the priority given to each of the labour market problems to be tackled;  the features of employment protection legislation that can best contribute to achieving the reform objectives;  the need to address other issues than the legislation itself (e.g. unemployment benefits) to ensure the reform path is effective and feasible; and  the wide differences in national employment protection legislation systems and the need to preserve their internal coherence.
Appropriate complementary measures, ensuring 'flexicurity', are essential when reforming employment protection legislation. According to the 'flexicurity' paradigm, the focus should be shifted from protecting the specific job (job security) to providing employment security over a person's working life. This means that greater contractual flexibility should accompany reforms providing universal and adequate coverage of unemployment benefits, effective active labour market policies and lifelong learning opportunities. These measures would help workers make the transition from temporary to permanent contracts and give them adequate levels of security to face heightened labour market risks.
Support by social partners is essential to implementing ambitious reforms of employment protection legislation effectively and ensuring they are socially sustainable.
The sequencing and timing of reforms are important. Weakening employment protection legislation during a downturn may cause greater job destruction that is not compensated by higher job creation. This may result in higher unemployment (and higher spending on unemployment benefits) in the short run, although in the medium term this will be compensated by stronger job creation.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF POLICY STATE OF PLAY
Member States' regulations appear highly heterogeneous, even within groups of countries with similar socioeconomic characteristics. The biggest differences in employment protection legislation across the EU are in the regime for dismissing people on regular contracts. The differences relate not only to the legislation's stringency but also the instruments to protect workers against dismissal. The greatest differences concern the definition of fair and unfair dismissal and the related remedies. Where severance payments exist, the amount varies greatly between Member States depending on the reason for dismissal (justified or not justified) and other conditions. The regulation of temporary contracts also differs quite considerably within the limits of the principles set out in the Directives on fixed-term work and temporary agency work. Member States also differ on the rules and procedures for collective dismissals.
However, common principles enshrined in the Directives on collective redundancies 18 somewhat reduce the variations between EU countries.
Employment protection legislation indicators make it possible to quantify the overall strictness of employment protection legislation and to compare different countries. The OECD compiles such indicators for most of its member countries (the OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index) from 21 elements of legislation (see Figure 5 and Table  1 In some countries, procedures for collective dismissals have been simplified and their cost therefore reduced. The regulation of temporary contracts has been changed to discourage their excessive use, including through higher non-wage costs 23 . As a consequence, the employment protection legislation indicator for openended contracts has either remained constant or markedly decreased ( Figure 6 ).
The fall in the indicator appears to be particularly strong for Portugal, but reductions can also be seen for Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia Slovakia, and the UK. For some countries (e.g. Italy, the Netherlands) the indicator is not able to capture the effect of labour market reforms implemented after 2013. Activity to reform employment protection legislation has been particularly intense in countries with both large accumulated imbalances and stringent job protection legislation before the crisis. These include Spain, Croatia, France, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia. Belgium passed the single status law, essentially harmonising notice periods between blue and white collar workers and redefining unfair dismissals. Dismissal costs, including for collective dismissals, were also reduced in the United Kingdom. The remainder of the section presents a partial list of reforms implemented in recent years.
Croatia completed the labour law reform started in 2013 by adopting the Labour Act in 2014. This facilitates the use of some forms of non-standard work and simplifies dismissal procedures. In August 2016, France introduced a reform specifying the circumstances in which individual dismissals can be undertaken for economic reasons. The reform also introduces more flexibility into how working conditions are set at company level. In 2014, Italy adopted a comprehensive labour market reform in the form of the Jobs Act. Among other things, this revises dismissal rules for open-ended contracts, simplifies and reduces non-standard forms of contracts and increases internal flexibility rules within firms.
In Lithuania, the revision of the Labour Code passed in 2016 reduced the cost of individual dismissals by shortening the notice period and reducing severance pay. It also loosened restrictions on using fixedterm contacts and introduced a number of new contract types. These include apprenticeship contracts, project-based work contracts, jobsharing contracts and multipleemployer contracts. In July 2015, the Netherlands introduced a cap on severance payments for unfair dismissal and provided more clarity on the routes to be followed in case of dismissal (the Public Employment Service in case of economic reasons and the courts in case of personal reasons). The maximum duration of temporary contracts was also reduced (from 3 to 2 years) and the number of months between contracts before a new chain of temporary contracts can start was increased. In 2016 Poland introduced restrictions on the number of consecutive fixed-term employment contracts and on their maximum duration. It also brought the notice period for fixed-term contracts into line with that for permanent contracts.
More generally, a number of Member States have tightened limits on fixedterm contracts, and more specifically on the use of temporary agency work (e.g. Denmark, France, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia). By contrast, others have facilitated access to fixed-term contracts (e.g. Czech Republic) and temporary agency work (e.g. Greece, Lithuania). Some (e.g. Croatia, Italy, Portugal,) have increased the duration or renewal possibilities of fixed-term contracts in order to encourage job creation. This form of employment meets a real need of user firms: it enables them, for instance, to manage production peaks or replace absent employees fairly easily. The minimum level of requirements to protect temporary agency workers are set by the 2008 Directive on temporary agency work 27 . 
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